Lower Myanmar: urban guerrillas and new patterns of resistance

An armed resistance

Unlike in previous eras of military rule, when the Bamar heartland remained unaffected by insurgencies plaguing Myanmar’s frontier areas, today the country’s interior is a conflict zone. The expanded battlefield features new irregular forces waging a frontless conflict against the junta and its supporters in urban areas of lower Myanmar.

The new cast of conflict actors

Resistance to the military coup is expanding Myanmar’s complex typology of conflict actors. Post-coup conflict actors can broadly be categorised as State Administration Council (SAC) forces and their proxies, ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), and anti-SAC forces. Hundreds of anti-SAC local defence forces are strewn across the country, with by far the highest density of urban groups in Yangon. While some of them emerged as early as April 2021 in Yangon in the wake of the military crackdown, many but not all groups declared alignment with the National Unity Government (NUG) soon after it announced an uprising and the formation of PDFs in September 2021. As of October 2022, the NUG and its allies claimed to have around 300 PDF battalions nationwide, each with 200–500 members. The most well-armed PDFs are in the southeast, working with EAOs. Across the country as a whole however, most members of the resistance forces have not been supplied with a weapon.

New conflict actors resisting the junta’s rule in lower Myanmar are primarily young people engaged in political violence for the first time, having witnessed military and police brutality

New conflict actors resisting the junta’s rule in lower Myanmar are primarily young people engaged in political violence for the first time, having witnessed military and police brutality. Some travelled to ‘liberated’ EAO strongholds for combat training, returning with new skills in using small arms and explosives for carrying out guerrilla attacks. Sources close to resistance groups in Yangon report that because many young people have been captured and imprisoned returning from ethnic areas, guerrillas are increasingly opting to develop skills through online material and tutorials. They are also procuring IEDs through local underground markets.

There are numerous self-styled anti-junta guerrilla groups across lower Myanmar, with names such as the Civil Guerrilla Force–Yangon, the Anti-Coup People’s Liberation Force, From Zero to Hero, and the South Dagon Guerrilla Force. The majority of small independent groups have carried out no more than three separate attacks since the coup, while the most active groups have carried out at least 20. Many attacks against SAC targets, particularly in Yangon, have not been claimed by any guerrilla group.

The relationships between anti-junta PDFs and independent local forces in lower Myanmar are complex, and they compete for popular support. According to sources on the ground, most groups in Yangon and other parts of lower Myanmar claim alignment with the NUG and are likely to have greater success in raising funds from local populations than groups working entirely independently. For many resistance groups, however, the NUG neither offers resources nor provides leadership in developing guerrilla strategies.

The weaponry of most resistance groups in lower Myanmar consists mainly of crude IEDs, low-quality small arms, and bladed weapons

Given the NUG’s sparse resources for armed resistance, urban PDFs operating in military strongholds have often found that their requests for arms and funds cannot be met. The weaponry of most resistance groups in lower Myanmar consists mainly of crude IEDs, low-quality small arms, and bladed weapons. In warscapes where the junta is weaker and the EAO presence is stronger, such as the southeast, PDFs are deploying higher-level technology, including militarised drones.

There have been some efforts by resistance groups to create coalitions rather than compete. One example is the NUG’s urban operation Nan Htike Aung (roughly meaning ‘Triumph for the Throne’), which from April to October 2022 brought together PDFs in Yangon, Ayeyarwady, Bago and Tanintharyi regions, as well as Mon State. The NUG claims the operation involved 220 attacks and killed 227 junta personnel. In May 2022, 14 urban guerrilla groups in Yangon formed an alliance called the Yangon Underground Association, with apparent links to the NUG, to increase their attacks on the military regime. Urban guerrilla groups also often work in partnerships to carry out attacks in more than one location. In Naypyidaw, where around eight guerrilla groups have been operational since the coup, groups aligned with the NUG collaborate in a highly challenging security environment, according to local sources.

Urban guerrilla warfare dynamics

Given the strategic importance of the nation’s economic hub, Yangon, and capital, Naypyidaw, for the revolutionary goals of the NUG and allied groups, how the conflict develops in lower Myanmar is critical for shaping war outcomes.

While many urban groups operate independently, the NUG is trying to bring independent resistance forces under its code of conduct

Unlike in some other countries affected by conflict, Myanmar’s transition to urban guerrilla warfare has not seen insurgents emerge from rural and often mountainous areas into cities to fight strategic battles. Instead, new conflict actors in the cities and towns of lower Myanmar tend to be residents of those same urban areas. Support for these groups from EAOs in more rural areas has been limited, given the saturated security environment. While many urban groups operate independently, the NUG is trying to bring independent resistance forces under its code of conduct.

Compared to the joint political and operational activity by anti-SAC groups – including EAOs and PDFs – in the southeast to the northwest, the anti-SAC forces in lower Myanmar are more fragmented. They also possess fewer resources. Whether PDFs and independent groups can eventually create a cellular system to carry out larger-scale and more closely coordinated campaigns will be critical to their success. Small independent groups that separately carry out only a handful of attacks may reduce the junta’s ability to govern but they will not gain territorial control of key sites and cities. Partnerships between conflict actors in lower Myanmar and strong PDFs and EAOs in neighbouring warscapes are also vital for improving access to resources and weapons supply chains, and potentially for hemming in the SAC.

The tactics most frequently used by urban guerrillas in lower Myanmar include IEDs placed near local administration offices, military infrastructure and police stations. Other attempts to unnerve the SAC include blanket death threats issued to affiliates of the junta, and assassinations of representatives of the military’s proxy political party, police officers, employees of military-owned companies, retired senior military officers, and township and ward administrators accused of acting as informants (dalan). In both Yangon and Bago there have been several coordinated attacks on military convoys using remote-controlled explosives, killing or injuring military and police personnel.

Across lower Myanmar, PDFs and local guerrilla groups have proved they can generate disorder and confusion for the junta’s forces. In 2021, new resistance groups were joining the conflict more quickly than the junta could capture and imprison armed actors.

However, anti-junta groups operating in this challenging security environment have faced significant setbacks, with infiltration campaigns by the junta’s 1st Military Intelligence Corps leading to the capture of many urban operatives, particularly in Yangon. The junta’s ability to penetrate resistance forces highlights the need for groups to improve counter-intelligence and selective information sharing, potentially through a firewalled cellular system that is compartmentalised to buttress organisational and individual security, if they want to advance their goals in this challenging security environment.

At present, fragmented resistance forces in lower Myanmar are able to reduce the ability of the military and the police to operate offensively, and can make it more difficult for the SAC regime to rule on its own terms

This type of cellular system could also be used for more coordinated and integrated campaigns by PDFs and independent forces. At present, fragmented resistance forces in lower Myanmar are able to reduce the ability of the military and the police to operate offensively, and can make it more difficult for the SAC regime to rule on its own terms. However, larger-scale and more coordinated operations will be needed for the resistance to achieve more strategically important outcomes.

A new threat environment for the junta

To exert control over the population of lower Myanmar, the SAC is deploying the established strategies of Myanmar’s earlier juntas – coercion through governmental functions and violence. Yet the proliferation of urban guerrillas and attacks in areas that have long been Tatmadaw strongholds is reordering the security environment for the military, while constraining the SAC’s capacity to run its administration.

The military has also imposed lengthy periods of martial law in many townships in lower Myanmar, either when facing specific threats or to protect strategic sites

Given the strategic importance of cities in lower Myanmar, the junta has increased surveillance and intelligence activity, launching operations to infiltrate resistance movements and mobilising pro-junta pyusawhti militias. The pyusawhti provide armed support on the ground, intelligence, and local knowledge. Efforts to infiltrate resistance groups – according to a leaked classified document – include strategies to create fake PDFs and local defence forces, leading to significant intelligence victories and the capture of operatives. The military has also imposed lengthy periods of martial law in many townships in lower Myanmar, either when facing specific threats or to protect strategic sites.

The junta’s siege mentality is visible in the militarisation of cities, including Yangon and Naypyidaw. During periods of heightened security, sources on the ground have said that police and soldiers in armoured vehicles regularly carry out patrols. At night, curfews are imposed and homes are frequently raided. Cordons and search operations block key roads where attacks have previously taken place against traffic police and other security personnel. In Naypyidaw, where the junta is strongest, new checkpoints and bunkers next to police stations have been built since late 2021. As motorists enter the capital, police and soldiers guard numerous checkpoints and major intersections, checking identification documents and sometimes searching vehicles.

Civil servants under the SAC continue to experience insecurity and threats from resistance groups. In Yangon, SAC government offices are often barricaded with cement walls and sandbags, and watched over by police. According to local sources, some officials now work discreetly at premises without government signs. This security environment – along with boycotts by resistance groups – is constraining the SAC’s ability to provide basic administration, collect taxes and recruit civil-service personnel.

To suppress support for the resistance in lower Myanmar, the junta is gradually increasing its coercive activity and use of violence against the population. Its actions include internet blackouts aimed at preventing anti-junta mobilisation online, and in urban areas random searches of young people’s mobile phones, looking for pictures, texts, Facebook likes or any other sign of support for the NUG. By confiscating property from landlords found to be renting to urban guerrillas, the junta is also making it more difficult for urban operatives to create safe houses. These strategies aim to deny resistance forces access to a population potentially sympathetic to their cause.

Since the coup, some 150 people have been sentenced to death, with the largest number in Yangon

As of March 2023, Yangon was home to almost a quarter of the 20,942 people who had been forcibly detained since the coup. These include teachers and healthcare workers who joined the anti-junta Civil Disobedience Movement and refused to go back to work and now face lengthy prison sentences. The SAC is also using the death penalty for the first time in decades against political opponents. Since the coup, some 150 people have been sentenced to death, with the largest number in Yangon. Scores of other political opponents and activists captured by the junta have died in custody after being tortured during interrogations.

Such violence will probably pacify some of the population but also push more young people to join the resistance, feeling they have no other way of achieving political change. Urban guerrilla groups will likely need these new recruits if they are to rebuild and advance their revolutionary goals in key areas such as Yangon and Naypyidaw.

How the conflict develops in the lower Myanmar warscape will determine if anti-SAC forces can achieve their aim of bringing down the junta. The resistance groups in these regions face the constant challenge of a frontless battleground, with the junta’s intelligence operations stronger there than anywhere else in the country. The fact that these groups are highly fragmented also remains a challenge for the NUG, which has struggled to equip and coordinate its supporters in lower Myanmar. It is unclear if anti-junta PDFs and independent forces can move beyond creating disorder to come together and shape a decisive outcome.

Nicola Williams is a PhD Scholar at the Australian National University (ANU)’s Crawford School of Public Policy and an ANU Myanmar Research Centre board member. She has 14 years of experience in international development specialising in conflict, peacebuilding, and governance, mainly in South and Southeast Asia.